



Abstract— This paper investigates the role of providers’ 
market shares for consumers and websites on interconnection 
settlements between networks. We proposed to differentiate 
traffic into two types, referred to as native and stranger in order 
to determine an original initiator of transmission in the IP 
network and to compensate the interconnection costs. In 
comparison to the existing financial settlement, under which the 
payments are based on the net traffic flows, the proposed model 
governs cost compensation according to the differentiated traffic 
flows. Analytical studies were provided using Nash bargaining 
solution to explore how the presented approach affects the 
providers’ payments. The key consequence of the obtained 
results shows that symmetry of the costs is not required 
prerequisite for peering, and asymmetric providers can arrange 
interconnection without monetary transfers. 
 
Index Terms— Interconnection arrangement, intercarrier 
compensation, Internet economics.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Internet is a system of interconnected networks, which 
are connected either through a direct link or through an 
intermediate point, called Internet exchange point (IXP) to 
exchange traffic. Currently the Internet provides two types of 
interconnections, such as peering and transit [1]. Peering is the 
arrangement of traffic exchange on the free-settlement basis, 
called bill-and-keep (BAK), so that the Internet service 
providers (ISPs) do not pay each other and derive revenues 
from the respective customers [2]. In the transit model a 
customer provider pays a transit provider to deliver the traffic 
between the customers. Negotiation process over being a 
transit or peered customer reflects on the assessment of the 
actual cost of traffic exchange and was studied in [3-4]. 
Peering offers several advantages in terms of interconnection 
costs and quality of data transmission, however, limits access 
to the network. As cited in [5] according to the estimates, 80% 
of the Internet traffic is routed via private peering. In some 
cases, however, in order to recover the infrastructure costs, 
instead of peering with the smaller ISPs, the larger ISPs offer 
transit arrangements that might be expensive, but give access 
to the whole Internet.  
Due to rapid growth of the Internet traffic, bottleneck 
occurs at IXPs among the networks [6]. The reasons of 
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peering bottleneck at the interconnection points are mostly 
economic. First, there is no money exchange between peers, 
since originated traffic volumes are symmetric and providers 
would both benefit equally. As a result, networks have little or 
no economic incentive to increase capacity to terminate traffic 
[7]. Second, lack of pricing at the peering points leads to the 
overuse of the network resources, and eventually, IXPs 
become congested.  
Traditionally, before interconnection the provider calculates 
whether the interconnection benefits would outweigh the costs 
[8]. In case of telephony, the study [9] argued that both calling 
and called parties benefit from the call, and consequently, 
should share the interconnection costs. In the Internet, under 
symmetry of traffic volumes, the termination costs are set to 
zero, since it is assumed that the termination fees are roughly 
the same, and peering arrangement is used. If traffic is 
unbalanced, interconnection arrangement is governed by the 
financial compensation in a unilaterally or bilaterally 
negotiated basis to recover the costs of the network. The 
survey and discussion on interconnection with the two-sided 
benefits are provided in [10-11]. 
Various aspects of interconnection of ISPs have been 
analyzed by [9], [12-14]. This work is focused on private 
peering arrangement and addresses the problem of cost 
sharing between providers. Generally, when providers are 
asymmetric in terms of size, peering model is not appropriate, 
since it is assumed that providers incur different costs and 
benefit differently. When analyzing economics of 
interconnection, existing literature considers intercarrier 
compensation based on the flows of traffic. However, it was 
cited in [5] that traffic flows are not a reasonable indicator to 
share the costs, since it is not clear who originally initiated any 
transmission and therefore, who should pay for the costs. In 
other words, compensation between providers cannot be solely 
done based on the traffic flows. 
The main objective of this research is to investigate the 
impact of providers’ market shares for consumers and 
websites on interconnection settlements between them. For 
this purpose we suggest to determine an original initiator of 
transmission by means of traffic differentiation into two types, 
referred to as native that is originally initiated by the 
provider’s own customers and stranger, which is initiated by 
the customers of a rival network. In comparison to the existing 
negotiated-financial settlement [3], under which the payments 
are based on the net traffic flows, this study proposes to 
compensate the costs according to the differentiated traffic 
flows. More specifically, each ISP compensates fully the 
termination costs incurred from delivering native traffic and 
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partially the termination costs incurred from carrying stranger 
traffic. Traffic differentiation allows introducing a caller 
concept similar to the telephony in the Internet. However, in 
contrast to the telephony, according to the proposed approach 
a transmission initiator is not considered as a cost causer, who 
should cover the joint costs, but rather both parties share the 
costs.  
Analytical studies based on the bargaining model were 
provided to determine the payments of the providers. The 
obtained results demonstrated that asymmetric providers under 
asymmetry of traffic flows could benefit equally, and on the 
other hand, identical providers in terms of size could benefit 
differently. Therefore, symmetry of costs structure is not 
required for peering. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II examines 
existing intercarrier compensation arrangements. Section III 
presents the motivation for traffic differentiation. Section IV 
provides analytical studies. Finally, Section V concludes the 
paper.  
II. INTERCARRIER COMPENSATION  
There are essentially two possible arrangements of 
intercarrier compensation for the telecommunication 
networks, such as BAK and calling party’s network pays 
(CPNP) [2]. The BAK model is fair and efficient under 
symmetry of traffic flows as well as termination charges and 
costs. However, because no termination cost is charged, BAK 
is considered inefficient in terms of the cost compensation 
[15]. Indeed, cost allocation is the issue of the combined 
marginal costs allocation, and therefore, costs should be 
allocated according to the benefits obtained by each party. 
Assuming that both parties benefit equally, under balanced 
traffic flows in both directions, BAK is appropriate.  
Unlike BAK, the CPNP arrangement assumes that the 
subscribers do not pay for the incoming calls. Instead, access 
charges are designed to compensate the interconnection costs. 
Under CPNP, the calling subscriber pays originating access 
charge to the calling party’s local exchange carrier (LEC) and 
terminating access charge to the called party’s LEC. The 
fundamental problem of this model is that terminating carrier, 
irrespective to its size, has a termination monopoly and can 
increase termination charges without lost of its customers [15]. 
The CPNP model is used in public switched telephone 
network (PSTN), however, is not applicable in the Internet. 
The principle reason is the difference in the infrastructures of 
these two networks. Unlike PSTN, which is circuit-based and 
connection-oriented, the Internet is packet-based and 
connectionless.  
III. TRAFFIC DIFFERENTIATION 
The principle that we follow is that both parties derive 
benefits from the exchanged traffic and should share the 
interconnection costs. Considering a system without 
externalities [3], [16], the costs should be shared based on the 
benefits obtained by each party. However, in real world, it is 
impossible to measure the benefits of parties and so to share 
the costs. When content is not equally distributed between 
providers, traffic imbalance occurs, and therefore, costs and 
revenues are not shared evenly. Indeed, the network that sends 
more traffic incurs lower cost, than the network that receives 
more traffic [17]. As cited in [18], traffic flow is dominant 
towards a customer requested the content and generates 85% 
of the Internet traffic. This implies that inbound traffic is much 
more compared to outbound traffic of content request. 
Generally, providers arrange the financial settlements in 
order to determine the distribution of the interconnection 
costs. To examine the financial settlements [3], [19] in the 
Internet, first, consider a telephony system where Alice makes 
a call to Bob. Accepting the call, Bob incurs termination costs 
to its provider that should be covered either directly by billing 
Bob or indirectly by billing calling party’s carrier. As cited in 
[15], “existing access charge rules and the majority of existing 
reciprocal compensation agreements require the calling party’s 
carrier, …, to compensate the called party’s carrier for 
terminating the call”. Thus, an initiator of the call, i.e. Alice 
pays the subscribed provider for the entire call, since Alice 
asked to reserve the circuit. In contrast to the telephony, in the 
Internet, Alice does not make any reservation of the circuit, 
and usually packets between Alice and Bob are routed 
independently via different paths. As cited in [12] “at this 
point, it is very important to distinguish between the initiator 
and the sender, and likewise between the destination and the 
receiver”. The initiator is the part that initiates a call or a 
session, and the destination is the part that receives a call. In 
comparison, the sender (the originator) is the part that sends 
traffic, and the receiver (the terminator) is the part that 
receives traffic. 
In telephony the initiator is considered as the originator and 
is charged based on the transaction unit, namely a “call 
minute” for using the terminating network. In the Internet, it 
might be argued that TCP session can be considered as a call, 
where the initiator of a session pays for the entire traffic flow. 
However, considering actual use of the network resources, 
financial settlement should be done at the IP level, accounting 
each packet of a flow. In this case, money flow direction 
coincides with the traffic flow direction. In summary, session-
based accounting, which faces with technical difficulties, is 
more complicated than a simple packet-based accounting, 
under which the volume of the exchanged traffic in both 
directions should be measured. Therefore, generally, providers 
adopt the negotiated-financial settlement, where payments are 
based on the net traffic flows. For detailed discussion see [3], 
[12], [20]. 
According to [5], the traffic flows are not a good meter for 
costs sharing, since “it is impossible to determine who 
originally initiated any given transmission on the Internet”. On 
the other hand, providers are unwilling to inspect the IP header 
of a packet, since “the cost of carrying an individual packet is 
extremely small, and the cost of accounting for each packet 
may well be greater than the cost of carrying the packet across 
the providers” [20]. 
In order to determine a party that originally initiated the 
traffic we propose to differentiate traffic into two types, 
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referred to as native, which is originally initiated by the 
provider’s own customers, and stranger that is originally 
initiated by the customers of the peered network. Indeed, 
outgoing traffic of ISPi that is the same as rival provider’s 
incoming traffic may be i) either a part of transmission 
initiated by a customer of ISPi, ii) or a part of transmission 
initiated by a customer of the peered network. Hence, it is 
assumed that the provider compensates the termination costs i) 
fully, if the exchanged traffic is native, and ii) partially, if the 
originated traffic is stranger. More specifically, the private 
peering networks settle the proposed agreement, whereby each 
partner is compensated for the termination costs that it incurs 
in carrying traffic according to the differentiated traffic flows.  
IV. THE MODEL OF INTERCONNECTION 
Analytical studies are based on the bargaining process that 
is explored using Nash bargaining solution. The intuition 
behind this principle is that peering is long term and repeated 
process, arranged under mutual benefit, and hence, sustainable 
cooperation between the interconnected providers is 
reasonable. This approach was studied in [21]. In analysis two 
types of the customers, namely consumers and websites are 
considered [13]. Actually, traffic is exchanged 1) between 
consumers, 2) between websites, 3) from websites to 
consumers, and 4) from consumers to websites. Generally, 
traffic between websites and from consumers to websites is 
negligible. Recently, peer-to-peer (P2P) traffic has increased 
rapidly. The significant part of the Internet traffic, comprised 
of FTP, Web, and streaming media traffic, is from websites to 
consumers. In order to investigate how the interconnection 
settlements depend on market shares for consumers and 
websites, we focus on traffic exchange i) between consumers, 
ii) from consumers to websites, and ii) from websites to 
consumers. Traffic between websites is neglected, since it 
does not have any significant impact on the results of the 
analysis. To simplify the analytical studies the following 
assumptions were made throughout the paper: 
Assumption 1 Let )1,0(∈iα  network i’s market share for 
consumers and )1,0(∈iβ  its market share for websites. It is 
assumed that there exist two providers i≠j=1,2 and 1=+ ji αα  
1=+ ji ββ . 
Assumption 2 The number of consumers and websites in the 
market is given by N  and M  respectively. Each customer 
chooses only one provider to join, because of homogeneity of 
the services. 
Assumption 3 For simplicity we assume a balanced calling 
pattern, where each consumer calls to any consumer, requests 
a call from any consumer as well as requests any website in 
any network with the same probability. In addition, each 
consumer downloads a fixed amount of content. 
We start by examining a scenario, when ISPi fails to sign an 
interconnection agreement with ISPj. The utility or benefit of 
joining ISPi for each consumer is ( ) ( )iiii fMNu βαβα +=+ ,, , 
and each website’s utility is ( ) ( )ii gNh αα =, . The presence of 
network positive externalities assumes that ( ) 0>⋅′f  and 
( ) 0>⋅′g  [16]. In case of disagreement between providers, the 
total traffic volume generated by ISPi is given by 
( ) NMxNMNNt iiiiiii βαβααα ++−= 1         (1) 
where x  is the average amount of traffic generated by each 
website. It is assumed that each consumer originates one unit 
of traffic per each request of website. Thus, pre-
interconnection demand function of network i is described by 
i
pre
i tD =  if ( ) 0≥+ iif βα and ( ) 0≥ig α       (2) 
Let network i’s marginal costs of origination and termination 
are 0>oic  and 0>tic  respectively, where tioi cc =  and ic  is the 
total marginal cost [13]. We do not consider fixed network 
cost, and for simplicity assume that transmission cost is 
normalized to zero, since peering model is considered. The 
profit of ISPi from on-net traffic is defined by  
( ) ( )[ ] iiiiiiii tcMgNf −++= αββααπ          (3) 
Suppose that ISPi obtained an agreement with ISPj. It is 
assumed that providers’ market shares for customers do not 
change in case of interconnection. In this case each 
consumer’s utility is ( ) ( )βαβα +=+ fMNu ,,  and each 
website’s utility is given by ( ) ( )αα gNh =, . The volumes of 
the differentiated traffic exchanged from ISPi to ISPj are given 
by  
NMNt jijinatij βααα += 2                (4) 
NMxt ijstrij βα=                 (5) 
where natijt  and strijt  denote native and stranger traffic volumes 
with respect to ISPi. Similarly, the traffic volumes from ISPj to 
ISPi are given by 
NMNt ijjinatji βααα += 2              (6) 
NMxt jistrji βα=                     (7) 
where natjit  and strjit  are native and stranger traffic volumes with 








jiji ttt +=                  (9) 
Thus, in case of agreement the demand of ISPi  is defined by 
ijii ttD +=  if ( ) 0≥+ βαf and ( ) 0≥αg      (10) 
Let ia  and ib  are network i’s access charges for terminating 
native and stranger traffic respectively, where ii ba > , since the 
provider compensates partially the costs of terminating 
stranger traffic. To carry out analysis, it is assumed that each 
network access charge for terminating native traffic is set to 
the termination marginal cost, i.e. tii ca = . The access charge 
for terminating stranger traffic determines how the costs are 
shared between consumers and websites. It is defined by 
ii ab ε= , where 15.0 <≤ε . However, in order to simplify 
analysis it is assumed that 5.0=ε .The profit of ISPi obtained 
interconnection is calculated as follows 
iii σπ +=Π                (11) 
where iσ  is the incremental profit that ISPi gets from the 
interconnection, i.e. from off-net traffic exchange, which is 
destined to a subscriber of another network and is given by 
( ) ( ) ( )joinatijiii actMgNf −−+++= αββαασ
( ) ( ) ( )tiistrjitiinatjijoistrij cbtcatbct −+−+−−+            (12) 
The outcome of i’s network according to the bargaining game 
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[22] is defined by 
( ) ( ) ijijijii πσσππφ ++=−+Π+Π= 5.05.0      (13) 
If ji σσ >  then ISPj receives the net payment from ISPi that is  
( ) σσσφ Δ=−=Π− 5.05.0 jijj          (14) 
It is assumed that the network externalities exhibit constant 
returns to scale, where ( ) 0=⋅′′f and ( ) 0=⋅′′g , meaning that the 
networks have the same incremental revenues, while the 
incremental costs increase as the network size decreases. By 
substituting (12) in (14), it can be obtained that  
( ) ( )[ ]tjoijnatijtiojinatjijj ccatccat −+−−+=Π− 225.0φ  
( ) ( )[ ]tjoijstrijtiojistrji ccbtccbt −+−−++ 225.0    (15) 
The net interconnection charge can be interpreted as two 
independent components i) one for native traffic business, 
which is denoted by natijσΔ ,  and ii) another for stranger traffic 
business that is denoted by strijσΔ . 
Proposition 1 The net payment from ISPi (ISPj) to ISPj (ISPi) 
is a) increasing in natjit and strjit ( natijt and strijt ), and b) decreasing 
in natijt and strijt  ( natjit and strjit ). 
Proof: Partially differentiating σσσ Δ=Δ+Δ strijnatij  with respect 
to the corresponding parameters leads to 




































Proposition 2 If 5.0== ji αα  and 5.0== ji ββ , then the net 
payments between providers are zero. 
Proof: Since the networks are symmetric in terms of size, 
therefore tjti cc = . From the conditions (4)-(7), (15) follows 
that natjinatij tt = , strjistrij tt = , ji σσ = , and 0=Π−=Π− jjii φφ . 
Proposition 3 If ji αα =  and ji ββ >  then ISPi subsidizes ISPj 
for native traffic. 
Proof: Since ji ββ > then tjti cc < . 
Native: From the conditions (4), (6) follows that natjinatij tt < . 
Considering the component for the native traffic business, it is 
obtained that ( ) ( )[ ] 0225.0 0 >−+−−+=Δ tjoijnatijtijinatjinatij ccatccatσ . 
Here, ISPi receives higher incremental profit and subsidizes 
ISPj.  
Stranger: On the other hand, from the conditions (5), (7) 
follows that strjistrij tt > . The net payment for stranger traffic is 
defined by ( ) ( )[ ]tjoijstrijtiojistrjistrij ccbtccbt −+−−+=Δ 225.0σ . This case 
is not straightforward and depends on ( )oistrijojstrji ctct − . Thus, it 









































σ          (16) 
Proposition 4 If ji ββ = and ji αα >  then ISPi (ISPj) subsidizes 
ISPj  (ISPi) for stranger (native) traffic. 
Proof: Since ji αα >  then tjti cc < . 
Native: From the conditions (4), (6) follows that natjinatij tt > . The 
net charge for native traffic is given by 
( ) ( )[ ] 0225.0 0 <−+−−+=Δ tjoijnatijtijinatjinatij ccatccatσ . 
Here, ISPj gets higher incremental profit from native traffic 
exchange and subsides for it. 




ij tt < . The component for the stranger traffic business is 
given by ( ) ( )[ ] 0225.0 >−+−−+=Δ tjoijstrijtiojistrjistrij ccbtccbtσ  
Then, ISPj receives the net charge for stranger traffic.  
Assuming that ji αα >  and ji ββ > , the following cases for 
the traffic volumes are obtained from the conditions (8)-(9): 1) 
jiij tt > , 2) jiij tt < , and 3) jiij tt = . The cases 1) and 2) are 
analogous to those described above. We analyze the case 
when jiij tt = .  
Proposition 5 If ji αα > , ji ββ > , and jiij tt =  then ii βα = . 
Proof: The result is obtained from the conditions (4)-(9). 
NMxNMNNMxNMN jiijjiijjiji βαβαααβαβααα ++=++ 22  
which gives: ( ) ( ) iiiiiiii βαβααββα ==>=−=−−− 011 . 




ij tt = . 
Proposition 6 If ji αα > , ji ββ > , and jiij tt =  then ISPi 
subsidizes ISPj for stranger traffic. 
Proof: Since ji αα > and ji ββ >  then tjti cc < . 
Native: The net payment for native traffic, when natjinatij tt =  is 
given by ( ) ( )[ ] 0225.0 0 =−+−−+=Δ tjoijnatijtijinatjinatij ccatccatσ  
Here, the incremental profits of the providers under symmetric 
traffic volumes are equal.  
Stranger: Considering stranger traffic business when strjistrij tt = , 
we get that ( ) ( )[ ] 0225.0 >−+−−+=Δ tjoijstrijtiojistrjistrij ccbtccbtσ  
Under symmetric stranger traffic, ISPj receives the net 
interconnection charge. 
Assuming that ji αα > , ji ββ <  and recalling that costs are 
higher for the smaller network then the following cases for the 




i cc = . The cases 1) and 2) are similar to those described 
above. The last case, when networks are identical in terms of 
size is examined below.  
Proposition 7 If ji αα > , ji ββ < , and tjti cc =  then ISPi (ISPj) 
subsidizes ISPj (ISPi) for stranger (native) traffic. 
Proof: Since networks are equal in terms of size, therefore 
MNMN jjii βαβα +=+  
which gives MN ji βα = and NM ji αβ = .  
Native: From the conditions (4), (6) follows that natjinatij tt > . 
Considering native traffic business, it can be obtained that 
( ) ( )[ ] 0225.0 0 <−+−−+=Δ tjoijnatijtijinatjinatij ccatccatσ  
Hence, ISPi gets the net payment from ISPj. 
Stranger: From the conditions (5), (7) follows that strjistrij tt < . 
Considering the business for stranger traffic, it can be obtained 
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that ( ) ( )[ ] 0225.0 >−+−−+=Δ tjoijstrijtiojistrjistrij ccbtccbtσ . 
In this case, ISPj receives the net payment from ISPi. 
 
TABLE I 
SUMMARY OF THE OBTAINED RESULTS 
α  β  tc  natt  natijσΔ  strt  strijσΔ  
ji αα = ji ββ =  tjti cc =  natjinatij tt =  natjinatij σσ =  strjistrij tt =  strjistrij σσ =  
ji αα = ji ββ >  tjti cc <  natjinatij tt <  natjinatij σσ >  strjistrij tt >  is conditional, defined by  (16) 
ji αα > ji ββ =  tjti cc <  natjinatij tt >  natjinatij σσ <  strjistrij tt <  strjistrij σσ >  
















ij σσ >  
























ij σσ >  
 
Table I summarizes the outcomes of the analytical studies. 
From the obtained results it can be concluded that asymmetric 
providers may decide to interconnect without monetary 
transfers. In this case, the net payment from ISPi for a 
particular type of traffic is the same as that from ISPj for 
another type of traffic, i.e. 0=Δ+Δ strijnatij σσ . On the other hand, 
the results showed that identical providers in terms of size 
could benefit differently. In this case, due to asymmetry in 
market shares for consumers and websites providers face 
different demand. Thus, compensation based on the net traffic 
flows is not straightforward; determination of an initiator of 
transmission by means of traffic differentiation encourages a 
more fair cost sharing between providers. 
In addition, taking into account the fact that no valid 
mathematical modeling of the evolution in the traffic 
distribution between networks exists, the most research works 
make the Assumption 3. Therefore, it is more reasonable to 
determine an initiator of the traffic to balance interconnection 
costs in reality.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper the impact of providers’ market shares for 
consumers and websites on the interconnection settlements 
between providers was explored. The key aspect of the 
proposed approach is based on determination of an original 
initiator of transmission by means of traffic differentiation into 
two types, referred to as native and stranger. In comparison to 
the existing financial settlement, under which the payments 
are based on the net traffic flows, the proposed approach 
governs cost compensation according to the differentiated 
traffic flows. More specifically, each provider compensates 
fully the termination costs incurred from delivering native 
traffic that is originally initiated by its own customers, and 
partially the termination costs incurred from carrying stranger 
traffic, which is originally initiated by the customers of the 
peered network. 
Several conclusions provided below are based on the 
analytical studies that investigated how the interconnection 
settlements depend on providers’ market shares (see Table I). 
Firstly, generally, in spite of termination costs the more 
incoming traffic of a particular type the more provider benefits 
from that type of traffic. Secondly, identical providers in terms 
of size due to different market shares for consumers and 
websites can benefit differently. And finally, asymmetric 
providers under asymmetry of traffic flows can arrange 
interconnection without monetary transfer. Therefore, the key 
consequence of the obtained results is that symmetry of the 
costs is not required prerequisite for peering. 
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